On May 23, 1939, more than three months before the start of the second world war, a meeting took place in the chancery of the Führer in Berlin in which the leading personalities of the Third Reich took part. During this conference Hitler presented a resumé of his policy to that point and stated that further achievements would not be possible without the shedding of blood. With respect to the war, planned from German side, he declared:

"Should fate force us into a confrontation with the west, then it would be good to have larger eastern territories. Even less than during peace, we will not be able to count on record harvests during war time. Since the people of non-German territories do not perform military service, they will be available for labor purposes." ¹

Exactly one month later the second sitting was held of the secret Reich defence council , the highest body dealing with matters concerning the preparation for war, under the chairmanship of Herman Göring. Technical problems with respect to the coming war, such as for instance the increased efficiency of the transportation system, were of secondary importance. The main target concerned the future of "Menschenverteilung" (distribution of people.) Concepts like "Menschenbilanz" (record keeping of people) and "Menschenersparnis" (people utilization) illustrated the main points. In addition to prisoners of war and their intended labor draft, Göring also dealt with the civilian population of the part of former Czechoslovakia, referred to as "protectorate." To this end the minutes of the meeting recorded:

"The chairman gave notice that during the war hundreds of thousands from industries not involved in armament in the protectorate, will be housed in barracks and engaged under supervision in Germany, primarily in agriculture." ²

The minutes of these meetings are among the earliest documents which give an indication about the fate awaiting civilians in the countries conquered by Germany during the second world war.

Even as the Reich's defence committee met, thousands of Czech civilian workers were already in Germany. The German Arbeitseinsatz (labor deployment) officials had recruited Czech men in the protectorate. However, after only a few weeks the number of volunteer workers diminished and German officials began to appy force in various ways.

"The right deployment of human labor resources during the war has been of interest to responsible authorities for some time, leading to far-reaching preparations. ... Of primary importance are the questions as to which reserves from the enemy armed forces and population in eventual parts of enemy territory should be deployed during the war." ³

Rachner determined that so far approximately 110,000 Polish prisoners of war, whose number would still rise, were allocated to the German agricultural sector. His basic premise was that all labor resources of the occupied territory must be controlled and deployed in case of an economic war, both for the maintenance of the economic foundation of the occupied territory, as well as for the strengthening of the German domestic economy. This purpose was achieved through the swift establishment of German employment offices in Poland.

 

"Reichshauptamtleiter Dr. Frauendorfer reports that so far approximately 160,000 farm workers and approximately 50,000 trade workers have been transported to the Reich, their total number to reach 500,000. It is hoped that sufficient voluntary registrations will follow.

Der Herr (Mr.) Generalgouverneur determines that, should all draft efforts prove to be unsuccessful, it must then be concluded that the Polish people shirk their labor duty for malicious reasons or for the purpose of, by not making themselves available, indirectly harming Germany. He therefore directs the question to Dr. Frauendorfer whether there were any measures left which had not been implemented to persuade Polish citizens into voluntary service. Reichshauptamtleiter Dr. Frauendorfer replies in the negative. Der Herr Generalgouverneur emphasizes that he would now have to take a definitve position. He therefore will question whether it will now be necessary to resort to some kind of measure of force.

Herr Generalgouverneur's question, whether SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger has the means to achieve such forced draft among Polish workers, is answered in the positive by SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. To his knowledge another 300,000 Polish workers will be sent to the Reich and it may be possible to satisfy this requirement when the labor draft decree will be in place. ...

Finally, der Herr Generalgouverneur concludes that the "marching order" has now been given. Further details will have to be worked out by the participating authorities. Should the Labor department be unable to succeed, the police would then have to enter the picture." ⁴

 

"Westarbeiter" (workers from the west)

In May 1940 the Wehrmacht attacked Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. While after a rapid subjugation of these countries Luxembourg was treated as "German", the generally highly qualified Belgians, French and Dutch would soon be available as Westarbeiter for the Arbeisteinsatz in Germany.

On May 5, 1940, two days after the capitulation of Belgium, the Bank of Germany presented a study entitled "What can we expect of Belgium?" It stated that in future almost the entire Belgian export could be directed to Germany. As a result of its important rail, metal and textile industries, as well as abundantly available raw materials, the occupation of this country would bring with it a significant strengthening in the Reich's armament potential. It was further determined that more than 50% of the Belgian population was employed in industry (and therefore had large numbers of tradesmen at its disposal.)

About the experience with the recruitment of Belgian civilian workers, the Reich labor publication reported in a multi-volume series entitled "About deployment of foreign workers in Germany". In it dr. Max Timm, cabinet counsel at the Reich labor ministry, communicated that German occupation authorities had been forced to dispense with the domestic staff of the employment offices - they had disappeared. Initially the recruitment had run into "certain difficulties" which however had been overcome "relatively quickly". Those guilty of breach of contract had been dealt with in an "appropriate manner." It had been possible to convince those in breach of contract to return to work in approximately 80% of all cases.

That nevertheless one could hardly speak of volunteers is evident from several decrees of the military commanders in Belgium and France. Two months after Timm's communication, the "Ordinance with respect to the securing of labor needs of special significance" states:

On October 7, 1942, this ordinance was further extended to apply in the German Reich. To the extent that the work took place within Reich territory, compulsory service applied to male workers from age 18 to 50 and to female workers from age 21 to 35. In the "Ordinance for the protection of labor peace" of December 10, 1942, the military authority threatens every Belgian with the death penalty in case of "serious instances of labor peace disruptions."

A Belgian worker was drafted in the following manner: had he been classified for labor in Germany, he would then have to report to the employment office. There it would be suggested that he register voluntarily for labor deployment in Germany. If he agreed he would receive certain compensation for himself and his family which would not apply in case of forced recruitment. If he refused he was then threatened with the loss of food rations. Under these circumstances a large proportion chose "voluntary" labor draft.

From October 1942 (the implementation of labor draft for the Reich) until March 6, 1943, the following picture obtained: 77,414 Belgians were summoned, of which 67,775 reported. Lacking qualifications, 19,024 were exempted. A total of 29,037 accepted "voluntary" draft and 19,714 forced draft. 4,947 Belgian refused to work in Germany. They risked incarceration of several months' duration.

By the end of May 1940, there were 271,000 registered unemployed in the occupied Netherlands. In September Reich employment offices" were set up whose new employees were assigned "primarily to the recruitment and counseling of workers for Germany." Initially the principle of voluntary service was applied. However, already in February 1941 an ordinance (no. 42) was introduced by which every Dutch citizen, upon the instruction of his employment office, could be forced to work in Germany for a limited period of time. In case of refusal this could lead to incarceration in a Strafarbeitslager (penal work camp.) From 1942, within the scope of several "Sauckel raids" (see below), extensive raids on companies and mass arrests on public streets took place during which tens of thousands of Dutch were forcefully deported to Germany as workers.

French workers were also among the Westarbeiter. Until November 29, 1942, 134,000 French workers went to Germany. As the other Westarbeiter (Belgian, Dutch) they too had limited labor contracts which they often did not renew upon completion. Dr. Timm also pointed to the fact that French workers were anything but happy to work in Germany:

"The French worker is, as is the whole country, under the effect of the defeat, above all disillusioned, suspicious and war-weary. Unless forced by extreme need, he would prefer to starve himself, rather than attain the pleasure of higher earnings by means of what would be for him an adventurous step." ⁷

This fact also occupied the weekly "people exchange" of the economic section aviation industry, which demanded an extension of the labor contracts. The recruitment of French workers during the initial phase of the second world war had been characterized by a euphemistic picture of Germany. Having been robbed of their illusions, many French returned home as soon as possible. This development was stopped by Sauckel's ordinance no. 10 which on August 22, 1942, instructed German authorities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands to introduce statutory regulations for enforcement measures (registration, limitations on exchange of work location, compulsory service, enlistment duty.) From then on the "enlistment practice" in France was also subject to conditions, as described by Sauckel during a meeting on March 1, 1944:

"The worst element I have to fight is the assertion that in these territories there is not a single German executive available to effectively force French, Italians or Belgians and put them to work. I have gone out of my way, using paid French and Italian men and women as agents, operating the way they shanghaied in the olden days, to go on a manhunt and with the use of schnapps and persuasion beguile people into going to Germany. Over and above this I have charged some able men with the task of organizing a special Arbeitseinsatz office, namely by training native men and arming them under the auspices of the Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer (higher SS and Police commander.) I now have to request permission from the munitions ministry to arm these people. All this because during the past few years alone several dozens of highly qualified senior Arbeitseinsatz officials have been shot." ⁸

"Ostarbeiter" (workers from the east, i.e. Soviet citizen) 

The deployment of civilian workers received a new quality after the attack of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941.) The Wehrmacht battled "Bolshevists" and invaded a country which, according to national-socialist principles was inhabited by "sub-humans." Up to this point nearly two million people from 18 European countries had been brought to Germany, among which 873,000 from Poland, more than 150,000 from Czechoslovakia, some 200,000 from Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as tens of thousands from France, Yugoslavia and other countries. Approximately 50% of them worked in agriculture, more than 30% in industry.

Prior to the attack on the Soviet Union the deployment of its citizens had not been considered. Even before the advance on Charkow the commanders of the German forces were anxious to possibly remove the soviet civilian population from their area of responsibility. The German leadership was of the opinion that, after the blitz victory over the Soviet Union, the freeing-up of Ostfront forces would result in the disappearance of the labor shortage in Germany. In addition, with respect to internal security it appeared extremely risky to deploy hundreds of thousands of "communists" in the Reich.

However, already shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union the Reich labor ministry as well as the Four-year-plan authorities reported an "absolute need" for 500,000 Soviet prisoners of war. Industry also expressed this opinion. It was thus that Reich organization Coal demanded 10,000 to 12,000 Ukrainian mineworkers from the area of Krivoi Rog for deployment in the Ruhr district. Realizing that Soviet workers had demonstrated efficiency in the building of huge industries in their own country, Göring allowed himself to be persuaded to utilize these workers in the Reich after all. Hitler also had put aside "national-political considerations." Reports of drastically increased labor needs forced him on October 13th to give broad approval for the deployment of Soviet civilians for the needs of German armament industry.

On November 7, 1941, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt RSHA (Reich security headquarters) dispatched a wireless message to engagement group C in Kiev:

The hundred thousand fold "Russeneinsatz" (deployment of Russians) started - the more so since the OKW had to admit on November 19 that the blitzkrieg concept had failed. Of the 49 assigned divisions in the east "almost none" could be disengaged. One could no longer count on returnees from the front. The Reich association Coal were supplied with the requested 10,000 to 12,000 Ukrainian miners.

Basis for the recruitment of Soviet workers was an ordinance of the minister for the occupied eastern territories of December 19, 1941, according to which "all citizens of the occupied eastern territory ... in consideration of their trade qualifications" were "subject to the public labor draft." The measures for the use of "Ostarbeiter" (the offical designation) were manifold, as was the case in other occupied territories. They ranged from psychologically skillful recruiting campaings to support in case of voluntary reporting, to terror. The latter prevailed, increasing as the war dragged on.

This is illustrated by a report from a first lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, dated May 10, 1943, about an Ostarbeiter transport with 2,190 Soviet citizens, including women and children, by which 108 (!) police and Wehrmacht guards took part:

"No particular occurrences during the journey. After darkness fell, shots were fired by escort commando's. At the first major stop the escort troops reported the disappearance of 18 - 20 men who had escaped through the windows. It was reported that several had been hit. Several shots were also fired during the journey. Arrival in Kiwerce at 4 o'clock. A head count revealed the escape of 66 men. With the next train a dying Ukrainian who had been shot, was brought along by the escort troops. Delousing started at 6 o'clock. At this point also the escort commando's had to guard the Ostarbeiter. At 20:15 hours continuation to Kowel. Again during this trip some persons escaped. ...

The above illustrated strict guarding of Ostarbeiter transports led to staffing bottlenecks. A communiqué of May 29, 1943, from the commander of the army patrol duty for travel in southern Russia reports that in the territory under this position, between April 26 and May 23, a total of 4,970 escort personnel were assigned. This had become necessary because of the increased number of transports but had led to considerable difficulties for the return transport of the escort staff. Occurrences such as the binding and gagging of guards by escapees also lessened the interest of the Wehrmacht authorities to assign an escort commando. The letter's author allowed himself also the instruction:

"... that, on the basis of personal observation and reports from subordinate offices, it must be established that the supervision and treatment of Ostarbeiter do not yet comply with pursued aims even by the most conservative evaluation. The considitions of the transport cars are in no way different from those of Russian prisoners of war. From statements of the native population it can be concluded that they almost equate the Arbeitseinsatz in Germany with all its attendant circumstances with deportation to Siberia.